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Questions Presented
I. Did the Secretary have the authority under 25 U.S.C. § 465 to acquire
land and hold it in trust for the Native Molokinian Government as a
"federally recognized" Indian tribe, despite Congress's subsequent
recognition of the Molokini Nation?
II. Was the Native Molokinian Government entitled to receive federal
acknowledgment through the administrative Office of Federal
Acknowledgment process, even though the Native Molokinian Government
extends membership to adopted children without Native Molokinian blood?
The Facts
The Native Molokinians are the original inhabitants of Molokini.
(Problem T 1.) They are the only Native group within the Pacific Islands
and they currently make up the state of Molokini. (Id.) Since time
immemorial, the Native Molokinians have been self-governing and have a
highly sophisticated form of government. (Id.) In the early seventeenth
century, the Native Molokinians formed treaties with the United States,
France, the United Kingdom and other international States. (Id.) In the late
nineteenth century the United States overthrew the Native Molokinian
government. (Id.) After destroying their government, the United States
annexed Molokini as part of their territory in 1898. (Id.)
In 1921, the United States Congress passed the Molokinian Homestead
Act in order to establish a permanent land base for the benefit and use of
the Native Molokinians, and to ensure that the lands set aside under the Act
would always be held in trust for continued use by the Native Molokinians
in perpetuity. (Problem 2.) The Molokinian Act granted benefits to
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Native Molokinian descendants with no less than one-half part of the blood
of the races inhabiting Molokini previous to 1778. (Id.) The Act established
a special trust relationship between the federal government and the Native
Molokinians. (Id.)
In 1959 the territory of Molokini became a state. (Problem 3.) Upon
statehood, the United States transferred its trust relationship with the
Molokini people to the new Molokini State Government. (Id.) The federal
government retained oversight authority as well as the ability to amend the
1921 Homestead Act and sue on the behalf of the Native Molikinians for
breach of trust. (Id.)
In 2011, the State Legislature of Molokini passed Act 200, which
recognized Native Molokinian people as the only indigenous people of
Molokini. (Problem 4.) The Act also established a commission to
prepare and maintain a roll of "qualified Native Molokinians." (Id.) The
Act defines "qualified Molokinians" as: (1) An individual who is a
descendant of the aboriginal peoples who prior to 1778, occupied and
exercised sovereignty in the area that now constitutes the state of Molokini,
or, (2) An indigenous Native individual of Molokini who was eligible in
1921 for the programs authorized by the Molokinian Homestead Act, or
someone who is a direct lineal descendant of that individual, and (3) The
individual has maintained a significant cultural, social, or civic connection
to the Native Molokinian community and wishes to participate in the
organization of the Native Molokinian governing entity, and is 18 years of
age or older. (Id.) Act 200 states that the persons on the roll of "qualified
Native Molokinians" and the decendants of those members are recognized
by the State of Molokini as the indigenous, aboriginal, Maoli population of
Molokini. (Id.)
In 2014, the Commission dissolved after completing the rolls. (Problem
5.) The qualified Native Molokinians independently organized and held a
referendum vote repudiating the one half blood quantum requirement and
making all qualified Native Molokinians eligible to participate in the
nation-building process. (Id.) Additionally, they voted to allow all adopted
children of Native Molokinians that maintain significant cultural, social, or
civic connections to the Native Molokinian community to be eligible to
participate in nation-building process; even if they lack Native Molokinian
blood. (Id.) The decision to allow adopted children to be eligible to
participate in the nation-building process was respectful of, and consistent
with the long standing Native Molokinian tradition of considering adopted
children to be descendants of their adoptive parents. (Problem T 6.)
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The Indian Reorganization Act was amended in 2013 to include "all
federally recognized Indian Tribes" instead of the more restrictive "now
federally recognized tribes" originally in the Act's language. (Id.)
Consistent with those amendments, the people of the Native Molokinian
Nation adopted a constitution, and elected leadership. (Id.) The Native
Molokinian body politic petitioned the federal government's Office of
Federal Acknowledgement ("OFA"), and received federal recognition in
January 2016. (Id.) The OFA determined that the Native Molokinians
criteria for membership met the requirement that membership consist of
individuals who descend from historical Indian tribes. (Id.)
After receiving federal recognition the Native Molokinian Government
purchased 50,000 acres of their traditional land from a sugar plantation.
(Problem T 7.) The Native Molokinian Government wanted to build homes
for its enrolled members, as well as a school, hospital, and government
building with executive, legislative, and judicial offices on the newly
purchased land. (Id.) In order to do so, the Native Molokinian Government
petitioned the Secretary of Interior to take the 50,000 acres of land into trust
pursuant to 25 U.S.C. § 465. (Id.) The 2013 amendments to the Indian
Reorganization Act also affirmed the Secretary's authority to take land into
trust for all "federally recognized Indian tribes." (Id.) In January of 2017,
the Secretary of Interior approved the petition and informed the State of
Molokini of its acceptance. (Problem T 10.)
Just prior to the Secretary of Interior informing the State of its approval,
the State of Molokini Legislature passed Act 100 in January of 2017.
(Problem T 8.) The Act states that only those "qualified Native
Molokinians" that were enrolled by the Native Molokinian Roll
Commission pursuant to Act 200 are the indigenous, aboriginal, Maoli
people of Molokini. (Id.)
The United States Congress passed the "Molokini Nation Reorganization
Act in January of 2017." (Problem 9.) The State of Molokini's U.S.
Senator, whose party has recently taken control of both the White House
and Congress, pushed the Act through Congress in an attempt to use the
controversial issue of blood quantum to divide the Native Molokinians, and
frustrate their efforts to achieve self-governance. (Id.) The federal
legislation grants federal recognition only to those Native Molokinians
currently residing on homestead land, who are eligible to receive benefits
under the Molokinian Homestead Act of 1921. (Id.) The Molokini Nation
Reorganization Act states that the Molokini Nation is the "representative
sovereign governing body of the Native Molokinian people" and "the single
federally recognized Native Molokinian governing entity." (Id.) A group of
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Native Molokinians who meet the blood quantum eligibility requirements
under the Molokinian Homestead Act of 1921 create a reorganized
Molokini Nation Government pursuant to the Molokini Nation
Reorganization Act. (Problem T 10.)
The Proceedings
The State of Molokini appealed the Secretary of Interior's decision to
take the 50,000 acres into trust for the Native Molokinan Government to the
Interior Board of Indian Appeals, which upheld the Secretary's decision.
(Problem 11.) The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
upheld the decision of the Secretary. (Id) The court stated that (1) The
Native Molokinian Government constitutes a "federally recognized" Indian
tribe, and the Secretary had the authority under 25 U.S.C. § 465 to acquire
land and hold it in trust for the tribe, and (2) that the Native Molokinian
Government possesses the inherent authority to define "descendancy" for
membership purposes, and membership may include persons without
Native Molokinian blood when there is a strong cultural basis for the
inclusion, and the OFA has the authority to recognize such a group. (Id.)
The Native Molokinian Government was entitled to receive federal
acknowledgement through the administrative OFA process. (Id.) This
Court granted their petition for certiorari. (Id.)
Summary Of The Argument
L The Supreme Court should affirm the United States Court of Appeals for
the Ninth Circuit, and uphold the Secretary ofInterior's decision to put the
Native Molokinian Government's 50,000 acres into trust in accordance
with 25 U.S. C § 465 of the Indian Reorganization Act, because the
Secretary has authority to hold land in trust for the federally recognized
Tribe.
First, The United States Government has recognized the special need to
preserve Tribal lands since its passage of the Indian Reorganization Act
("IRA") of 1934. In Carcieri v. Salazar, this Court held that in order to be
eligible to receive land in trust under the IRA, a tribe had to be federally
recognized at the time of its implementation. The Native Molokinian
Government has been a federally recognized tribe since the Molokinian
Homestead Act of 1921. Since the Tribe was federally recognized at the
implementation of the IRA, through that Congressional legislation, the
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Secretary has authority to take land into trust for the Native Molokinian
Government.
Second, even if the Court finds that the Native Molokinan Government
was not a federally recognized tribe in 1934, the 2013 Amendment to the
IRA gives the Secretary broad discretion to determine which Indian Tribes
should come within the scope of the Act. Reversing the Secretary's
decision to grant the Native Molokinian Government's petition for their
50,000 acres to be placed into trust would be an affront to the longstanding
principle of giving full deference to agency discretion. Chevron U.S.A., Inc.
v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
Finally, The Native Molokinian Government remains a federally
recognized tribe despite Congress' subsequent recognition of the Molokini
Nation. Taking away the Native Molokinian Government's trust land due
to the federal recognition of the Molokini Nation would constitute a
preference of one federally recognized tribe over another. Allowing the
Molokini Nation preference over the Molokinian Government would be a
violation of 25 U.S.C.A. § 476, which prohibits discrimination amongst
Tribes.
II. The Ninth Circuit Court ofAppeals rightly upheld the federal
recognition of the Native Molokinian Government even though it extends
membership to adopted children without Native Molokinian blood, and this
Court should affirm the Secretary's decision to bring the 50,000 acres of
land into trust for the Tribe.
First, this Court should not review the Office of Federal
Acknowledgment's ("OFA") decision to federally recognize the Native
Molokinian Government because federal recognition is a non-justiciable
political question. Even if this Court were to adjudicate the OFA's decision,
it should find that the OFA properly exercised its authority to recognize the
Native Molokinian Government notwithstanding the fact that it extended
membership to adopted children that may lack Native Molokinian blood.
The OFA acted in accordance to the Code of Federal Regulations, and from
a policy perspective, the trend of federal common law to broadly construe
Indian status for adjudicatory purposes implies that the Native Molokinian
Government should also be able to broadly construe tribal membership.
Second, as a federally recognized tribe, the Native Molokinian
Government retains the inherent sovereign power to self-govern that is both
pre and extra-constitutional, and can only be diminished by a clear act of
Congress. Determining tribal membership is a fundamental attribute of the
Native Molokinian Government's sovereign authority, and thus, should not
327No. 1]
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be scrutinized by this Court regardless of how it determines who its
members are. Furthermore, the Native Molokiniain Government's
membership provisions are consistent with the requisite political
classification to sustain the statutory and regulatory privileges often
afforded to Indian tribes. To accept the State's appeal to reinstate a race-
based policy for recognition would be to accept an unconstitutionally
discriminatory policy.
Accordingly, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals properly upheld the
federal recognition of the Native Molokinian Government, and this Court
should affirm the decision for the Secretary to put the 50,000 acres of
former Molokinian land into trust for the Tribe.
Argument
I. This Court should affirm the Ninth Circuit Court ofAppeals' decision,
and uphold the Secretary's authority to acquire land and hold it in trust for
the Native Molokinian Government under federal statutory and common
law, because the Native Molokinian Government remains a federally
recognized Indian tribe regardless of Congress's subsequent recognition of
the Molokini Nation.
"Land forms the basis for social, cultural, religious, political, and
economic life for American Indian nations," 1-15 Cohen's Handbook of
Federal Indian Law § 15.01.
Preserving a tribal land base is essential for the survival of Indigenous
groups. Id. The United States government has recognized the special need
to preserve tribal lands since its passage of the Indian Reorganization Act
("IRA") of 1934. Id. The IRA was a means for Congress to address many
of the past wrongs directed at American Indians and provide an opportunity
to restore Native lands to their rightful owners. The Act codified in Title 25
section 465 of the United States Code Annotated gives the Secretary of
Interior authority to acquire land for American Indians. 25 U.S.C.A. § 465.
The Native Molokinian Government has been a federally recognized tribe
since 1934, and thus is entitled to benefit from the provisions of the IRA.
Moreover, the Native Molokinian government remains a federally
recognized tribe despite the recognition of the Molokini Nation.
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A. This Court should uphold the Secretary ofInterior's authority to take
land into trust for the Native Molokinian Government under federal
common law because the Native Molokinian Government has been a
federally recognized Indian Tribe since 1934, and therefore is eligible to
have land taken into trust under 25 U.S. C.A. § 465.
When a statute's language is clear, agency interpretation is irrelevant,
and the statute is applied according to its plain meaning. Carcieri v.
Salazar, 555 U.S. 379 (2009). The Indian Reorganization Act of 1934
allows the Secretary to place land into trust for Indians. 25 U.S.C. § 465.
The Act defines Indians as "all persons of Indian descent who are members
of any recognized Indian tribe now under Federal jurisdiction." Id. In 2009
the Supreme Court in Carcieri, stated that the definition was unambiguous
and "now under federal jurisdiction" could only be interpreted to refer to
tribes already federally recognized in 1934 at the Act's implementation.
555 U.S. at 382. The Native Molokinian Government was a federally
recognized tribe in 1934. Therefore, the Secretary's decision to bring their
land into trust should be upheld.
In Carcieri, the Supreme Court held that because the Narragansett tribe
was not a federally recognized tribe in 1934 when the Indian
Reorganization Act was implemented, they were not eligible to receive land
into trust under the Secretary's discretion. Id. at 383. The Narragansett tribe
relinquished its tribal authority and was essentially assimilated into the
State of Rhode Island during the late 19 th century. Id. at 383. Despite
attempts to receive federal assistance in the early 1900's, the federal
government rejected all of the Tribe's requests, citing the New England
State's jurisdiction over the Tribe. Id. at 384. The Narragansett did not
gain federal recognition until 1983. Id. After they received recognition,
they petitioned the Secretary to put a parcel of land into trust, and,
interpreting the statute's language to mean that trust land could be granted
to any Indian tribe currently recognized by the federal government, the
Secretary granted their request. Id. at 385. The Supreme Court held that
was an impermissible interpretation of the definition of an "Indian" under
the IRA, and that the Statute's language clearly refers to members of tribes
that were under federal jurisdiction at the time the IRA was enacted. Id. at
391. Therefore, the Secretary did not have authority to take land into trust
for the tribe.
Unlike the tribe in Carcieri, the members of the Native Molokinian
Government were federally recognized in 1934 when the Indian
Reorganization Act was implemented. The Homestead Act of 1921
federally recognized the Native Molokinian people and created a trust
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relationship between the federal government and the Native Molokinians in
order to establish a permanent land base for their benefit. (Problem T 2.)
The United States did not transfer its trust obligations to the Molokini State
government until 1959; therefore, when Indian Reorganization Act was
implemented in 1934, the Native Molokinians were a federally recognized
tribe, eligible to receive land in trust pursuant to 25 U.S.C. § 465.
Moreover, the United States maintained a relationship with the Native
Molokinian people even after they transferred their 1921 trust obligations to
the State; the federal government retained oversight authority and the
authority to sue on the behalf of Native Molokinians, and thereby continued
to federally recognize them. (Problem 3.) The Native Molokinian
Government was formed directly by the Native Molokinians originally
recognized by the 1921 Homesteading Act. Therefore, the Secretary had
authority to take land into trust for the Native Molokinian Government,
because they were a federally recognized tribe in 1934, and bringing their
land into trust is consistent with this Court's opinion in Carcieri.
1. Even if the court determines the Native Molokinian Government was
not a federally recognized tribe in 1934, after the 2013 amendments to
the IRA, all federally recognized tribes without regard to the date at
which they are recognized are now eligible to have land taken into trust.
In 2013, Congress amended the Indian Reorganization Act and changed
the 1934 language from tribes "now under federal jurisdiction," to "all
federally recognized tribes." 25 U.S.C. § 465; (Problem 9.) While the
original language of the IRA, unambiguously referred to Indian tribes
recognized at the time the Act was implemented, the new language reflects
Congress's attempt to give the statute broader reach. "All federally
recognized tribes" either unambiguously refers to all tribes given federal
recognition at any point, or is ambiguous language that should give the
Secretary deference to determine its scope. Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural
Recourses Def Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984). Therefore, even if the
Court finds that the Native Molokinian Government was not federally
recognized in 1934, they are now a federally recognized tribe. Therefore,
the Secretary may put their land into trust. The federally recognized
members of the Native Molokinian Tribe created the Native Molokinian
Government, and therefore the Native Molokinian Government has been a
federally recognized tribe since 1921. However, even if the Court
determines that the Native Molokinian Government is a separate band from
the Native Molokinians recognized under the Native Molokinian
Homestead Act of 1921, the Office of Federal Acknowledgement formally
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recognized the Native Molokinian Government in 2016. (Problem T 8.)
The Native Government met all the criteria for federal recognition. Id. In
granting the Native Molokinian's request to put their land into trust, the
Secretary has determined that the IRA's reach extends to the Native
Molokinian Government. In light of the 2013 Amendment, the Secretary's
decision to acquire land and hold it in trust for the recognized Native
Molokinian Government should be given deference.
2. This Court should uphold the Secretary ofInterior's authority to take
land into trust for the Molokinian Government under 25 U.S. C.A. § 465
and its 2013 amendment, because the decision was consistent with
principles of Chevron deference.
When Congress delegates authority to an agency through legislation, the
agency's secretary is granted deference to interpret the statute's reach.
Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S.
837 (1984). If Congressional delegation of authority for an agency to
interpret a statute is explicit,
"[s]uch legislative regulations are given controlling weight unless they
are arbitrary, capricious, or manifestly contrary to the statute. [If]
delegation to an agency on a particular question is implicit rather than
explicit ... a court may not substitute its own construction of a statutory
provision for a reasonable interpretation made by the administrator of an
agency." Id. at 843-44.
With respect to the Indian Reorganization Act, the Statute's language
explicitly grants the Secretary with the decision to bring land into trust for
Indian tribes. 25 C.F.R. § 151.3. The 2013 Amendment to the Act replaces
the clear restrictive 1934 language with broad language giving the Secretary
authority to take land into trust for "all federally recognized tribes." The
language either clearly gives the Secretary authority to place land into trust
for any recognized tribe, or is ambiguous and allows the Secretary broad
discretion to determine which Tribes are eligible to receive trust land under
the act. Therefore, under principals of Chevron deference, the Secretary's
decision to bring that land into trust for the Native Molokini Tribe should
be upheld.
In Navajo Nation v. HHS, the court held that the Secretary of HHS's
interpretation of the Indian Self-Determination and Education Assistance
Act ("ISDEAA") was valid, and therefore, under Chevron principals of
deference the Secretary was not obligated to approve the Tribe's self-
determination contract for Temporary Assistance for Needy Family
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("TANF") funds. 285 F.3d 864, 875 (9th Cir. 2002). Congress
implemented the TANF program in 1996, which provided grants to states
and Indian Tribes that wanted to fund welfare programs for citizens in their
jurisdiction. Id. at 867. The Navajo Nation used the ISDEAA, which
provides programs for the benefit of Indians due to their special status as
Indians, to apply for TANF funds. Id. at 867, 868. Not all federal programs
can be transferred to the tribes through ISDEAA self-determination
contracts. Id. The Secretary rejected the Tribe's application, stating that it
went beyond the scope of the ISDEAA because the TANF program was not
intended to be implemented for the particular benefit of Indians, but rather
for all low-income peoples, and because the TANF funds did not meet the
requirements of a self-determination contract as enumerated in ISDEAA.
Id. at 868. The Secretary "interpreted 'program[] . . . for the benefit of
Indians because of their status as Indians' to mean that Indians must be the
exclusive beneficiaries of the program in question." Id. at 869. The court
determined that the legislation was ambiguous and that the Secretary's
interpretation was one reasonable possibility, and therefore, the Secretary's
decision should be given Chevron deference. Id. at 870. Congress gave the
Secretary of HHS authority to interpret the ISDEAA's meaning and
application. Therefore, the court must defer to that interpretation. Id. at
872.
Similarly to the statute at issue in Navajo Nation, Congress gave
authority to interpret the Indian Reorganization Act and the ability to apply
its provisions to Indian tribes to the Secretary of Interior. 25 U.S.C.A. §
465. The IRA grants the Secretary broad authority over the use and
acquisition of Indian lands, including the authority to place lands purchased
by tribes "in the name of the United States in trust for the Indian tribe or
individual Indian for which the land is acquired, and such lands or rights
shall be exempt from State and local taxation." 25 U.S.C.A. § 465. Under
the IRA and its 2013 amendment, the Secretary of Interior may bring land
into trust for an individual Indian or a tribe when:
"the property is located within the exterior boundaries of the tribe's
reservation or adjacent thereto, or within a tribal consolidation area; when
the tribe already owns an interest in the land; or when the Secretary
determines that the acquisition of the land is necessary to facilitate tribal
self-determination, economic development, or Indian housing." 25
C.F.R. 151.3.
The Native Molokini Government is a federally recognized Indian tribe
that purchased 50,000 acres of traditionally Native land, and therefore owns
interest in that land. (Problem 1 8.) The Secretary accepted the Native
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Molokini Government's land into trust pursuant to 25 U.S.C. § 465.
(Problem T 10.) Her decision that the Native Molokini Government was
eligible to have their land put into trust under the federal government was
not arbitrary and capricious, but rather reflected the Tribe's status, its
relationship to the land, and its desire to use the land in order to facilitate
self-determination and economic development. (Problem T 8.) Under the
2013 amendment, the Native Molokini Government is clearly intended to
benefit from 25 U.S.C. § 465, but even if the Court determines the statute's
application to the Native Molokini Government is unclear, it should defer to
the Secretary's interpretation of the IRA's reach under principles of
Chevron deference.
B. This Court should uphold the Secretary ofInterior's decision to take
land into trust for the Molokinian Government regardless of the
simultaneous recognition of the Molokinian Nation because 25 U.S. C.A. §
476 prohibits discrimination amongst federally recognized Tribes.
The federal government and its agencies cannot implement the Indian
Reorganization Act or any other act of Congress in a manner that "with
respect to a federally recognized Indian tribe . . . classifies, enhances, or
diminishes the privileges and immunities available to the Indian tribe
relative to other federally recognized tribes by virtue of their status as
Indian tribes." 25 U.S.C.A. § 476 (West). The federal government has
routinely recognized multiple Indian tribes and Indian bands that are
comprised of persons of the same race or persons that originate from the
same territories. See, e.g., The Sioux Nation: Graham v. United States and
Sioux Tribe ofIndians, 30 Ct. Cl. 318 (1895);; Cherokee Nation: E. Band of
Cherokee Indians v. Torres, 4 Cher. Rep. 9 (2005); U.S. Dep't of Interior,
Indian Affairs Tribal Directory, (Jan. 9, 2012) http://www.bia.gov/Who
WeAre/BIA/OIS/TribalGovernmentServices/TribalDirectory/index.htm.
When there is simultaneous recognition of tribes originating from the same
ancestors, the government cannot give preference to one band over the
other. 25 U.S.C.A. § 476 (f), (g). Moreover, the 2013 amendments to the
Indian Reorganization Act when read in conjunction with section 476, must
be interpreted in a manner that will not prefer one federally recognized tribe
over another. The Secretary's decision to hold land in trust for the Native
Molokinan Government should be upheld in order to ensure that the
federally recognized tribe is not treated in a discriminatory manner.
In Carcieri v. Norton, the court held that construing the definition of an
Indian to limit benefits only to tribes that were recognized at the time of the
enactment of the Indian Reorganization Act of 1934 would constitute
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discrimination against tribes that were subsequently recognized, and thus
violate 25 U.S.C.S. §§ 476(f), (g). 398 F.3d 22, 32 (2005). While the
court's decision was overruled by this Court in Carcieri v. Salazar, the
2013 Amendment to the Indian Reorganization Act, which clarified
Congress's intent to provide trust land and benefits to "all federally
recognized tribes," gives new weight to the previously overturned decision.
Even though the Native Molokinian Government has membership
guidelines differing from those of the subsequently recognized Molokini
Nation, both groups are federally recognized Indian tribes. (Problem T 9,
11.) In implementing statutes the government cannot act in a manner that
privileges one federal tribe over the other. United Houma Nation v.
Babbitt, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16437 (1996). Providing benefits to the
Molokini Nation and then denying them to the Native Molokini
Government frustrates the purpose of the Indian Reorganization Act as
clarified and reiterated by the 2013 Amendment, and its attempt to restore
Native territories to Indian tribes and assure tribal self-determination.
Moreover, it favors one federally recognized tribe over another, constituting
discrimination in violation of 25 U.S.C. §476. Therefore, this court should
uphold the Secretary's authority to acquire land and hold it in trust for the
Native Molokinian Government.
The State contends that the Molokinan Nation is the sole recognized tribe
of the State of Molokini.
"If the Congress and the Executive have determined that a group of
Indians is a tribe or the political representative of the tribe for the purpose
of defining its relationship to the United States and its powers and attributes
as a tribal government that decision is respected by the Judicial branch of
government." Cogo v. Cent. Council of Tlingit & Haida Indians ofAlaska,
465 F. Supp. 1286, 1289 (D. Alaska 1979).
Congress and the Executive have determined that the Native Molokinian
Government is a federally recognized tribe. However, even if the Native
Molokinian Government is determined to be a splinter group of the
Molokinan Nation, as the state contends, they have functioned from time
immemorial as an autonomous tribal entity and therefore should remain a
federally recognizable tribe. The Native Molokinian Government does not
require a specific blood quantum and allows adopted children, regardless of
their Native Molokinian ancestry, to be tribal members. The Native
Molokinian Government has implemented these guidelines because it
honors long standing traditional Native Molokinian practices. (Problem
8.) The Code of Federal Regulations, Title 25, section 83.3 states, "groups
that can establish clearly that they have functioned throughout history until
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the present as an autonomous tribal entity may be acknowledged under this
part, even though they have been regarded by some as part of, or have been
associated in some manner with an acknowledged North American Indian
tribe." The Native Molokinan government has exercised their sovereign
authority and remained a functioning tribal entity since time immemorial.
The Native Molokinian Government should retain their federally
recognized status despite the subsequent recognition of the Molokini
Nation.
II. This Court should uphold the federal recognition of the Native
Molokinian Government even though it extends membership to adopted
children without Native Molokinian blood, because Native Molokinians
possess the inherent sovereign authority to define descendancy for
membership purposes to include persons who are not racially members of
the group where there is a strong cultural basis for the inclusion, and
because the Office ofFederal Acknowledgement has the authority to
recognize a group so constituted.
The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals rightly upheld the federal
recognition of the Native Molokinian Government even though it extends
membership to adopted children without Native Molokinian blood, and this
Court should affirm the Secretary's decision to bring the 50,000 acres of
land into trust for the Tribe. First, this Court should not review the Office of
Federal Acknowledgment's ("OFA") decision to federally recognize the
Native Molokinian Government because federal recognition is a non-
justiciable political question. Even if this Court were to scrutinize the
OFA's recognition of the Native Molokinian Government, the OFA acted
within its delegated authority and in accordance to federal regulations when
it recognized the Native Molokinian Government. Second, as a federally
recognized Tribe, the Native Molokinian Government retains the inherent
sovereign power to self-govern. Determining tribal membership is a
fundamental attribute of the Native Molokinian Government's sovereignty,
and membership provisions are not subject to review by the courts,
regardless of how a tribe determines who its members are.
A. The OFA properly exercised its authority when it recognized the Native
Molokinian Government, and this Court should uphold the Secretary's
decision to bring land into trust for the Tribe.
This Court should uphold the federal recognition of the Native
Molokinian Government and affirm the Secretary's decision to bring the
50,000 acres of land into trust for the Tribe because (1) federal recognition
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of Indian tribes is a non-justiciable political question and should not be
adjudicated by this Court, and (2) the OFA properly recognized the Native
Molokinian Government even though its enrollment criteria extends
membership to adopted children that may lack Native Molokinian blood.
1. This Court should not review the OFA's decision to recognize the
Native Molokinian Government because recognition is a political
question.
The authority for the OFA to recognize tribes derives from the Secretary
of Interior's general authority over Indian affairs delineated at 5 U.S.C. §
301, 25 U.S.C. §§ 2 and 9, and 43 U.S.C. § 1457. Schaghticoke Tribal
Nation v. Kempthorne, 587 F. Supp. 2d 389, 420 (D. Conn. 2008). Making
a decision to federally recognize an Indian group is a political
determination, and is not justiciable by the courts. Samish Indian Nation v.
United States, 419 F.3d 1355, 1370 (Fed. Cir. 2005). Courts must defer to
the OFA, other executive agency, or Congress when faced with a challenge
to federal recognition. Id; see also United States v. Rickert 188 U.S. 432,
445 (1903); United States v. Sandoval, 231 U.S. 28, 46 (1913); Miami
Nation of Indians of Ind, Inc. v. Dep't of Interior, 255 F.3d 342, 346-48
(7th Cir. 2001); W Shoshone Bus. Council For and on Behalf of W
Shoshone Tribe of Duck Valley Reservation v. Babbitt, 1 F.3d 1052, 1057
(10th Cir. 1993); James v. United States Dep't of Health & Human Servs.,
824 F.2d 1132, 1137 (D.C. Cir. 1987). This Court has firmly established
that "[i]n reference to all matters of this kind, it is the rule of this
court to follow the action of the executive and other political departments
of the government, whose more special duty it is to determine such affairs.
If by them those Indians are recognized as a tribe, this court must do the
same." United States v. Holliday, 70 U.S. 407, 419 (1865).
Supreme Court precedent prohibits this Court from reviewing the OFA's
decision to recognize the Native Molokinian Government because federal
recognition is a non-justiciable political question. Courts continue to
prohibit review of federal recognition based on the political question
doctrine, and nothing distinguishes the instant case from any of the other
cases barring adjudication. The State's challenge to the OFA's recognition
of the Native Molokinian Government should end here.
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2. Even if this Court were to review the OFA's decision, it shouldfind
that it properly recognized the Native Molokinian Government according
to the Code of Federal Regulations and federal common law.
The only way the State could challenge the OFA's decision to recognize
the Native Molokinian Government would be under the Administrative
Procedure Act ("APA") "concerning the executive's recognition
determination under 25 C.F.R. Part 83." Samish Indian Nation, 419 F.3d at
1369; Schaghticoke Tribal Nation, 587 F. Supp. 2d at 420. The State brings
no such complaint. Even if this Court were to sua sponte review the OFA's
recognition of the Native Molokinian Government under the APA, it is
clear that the OFA acted within the guidelines provided by section 83 of the
Code of Federal Regulations.
The Code of Federal Regulations, 25 C.F.R. §83.7, establishes the
mandatory criteria for federal recognition, and permits the OFA to grant
great deference to the petitioning tribe with respect to membership
provisions. Section 83.7 allows tribes to present a wide range of evidence to
establish that the membership "consists of individuals who descend from a
historical Indian tribe." Id. at §83.7(e). Specifically, 25 C.F.R. §
83.7(e)(1)(iv) accepts "affidavits of recognition by tribal elders, leaders, or
the tribal governing body identifying present members or ancestors of
present members as being descendants of a historical tribe or tribes that
combined and functioned as a single autonomous political entity," to prove
descendancy for the purpose of membership.
In the instant case, the State conceded that the Native Molokinian
Government meets all of the criteria for acknowledgment through the OFA
process except for the membership requirement. (Problem 11.) It
challenges the OFA's recognition based on the Native Molokinian
Government's membership ordinance that extends membership to adopted
children that retain a strong connection to the community even if they do
not have Molokinian blood. (Id.) The State misinterprets the OFA's
authority to determine what descendency means.
Nothing in the Code of Federal Regulations establishing the mandatory
criteria for federal acknowledgment refers to blood quantum of any kind. 25
C.F.R. §83.7(e). Furthermore, 25 C.F.R. § 83.7(e)(1)(iv) accepts
recognition by the Tribe as sufficient evidence to prove descendency. The
Native Molokinian Government decided to extend membership to adopted
children that do not necessarily have Native Molokinian blood out of
respect for long-standing Native Molokinian tradition and customary social
organization. (Problem 6.) The OFA had the authority to accept the
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Native Molokinian Government's definition of descendency, and this Court
should affirm that decision.
Furthermore, this Court has traditionally deferred to tribal custom when
determining whether claimants may legally be considered Indians for the
purpose of adjudication. See, e.g., Waldron v. United States, 143 F. 413,
419 (C.C.D.S.D. 1905) (Tribal custom can define membership); Alberty v.
United States, 162 U.S. 499, 502-03 (1896) (Tribal courts have jurisdiction
over offenses committed Indians, which included Indians by adoption). In
Nofire v. United States, 164 U.S. 654, 658 (1897) this Court cited to
Cherokee Law when deciding that a man lacking any Cherokee blood was
"Indian" because he was adopted as a tribal member. It found that "[t]he
Cherokee statutes make it clear that all white men legally married to
Cherokee women and residing within the Nation are adopted citizens." Id.
In affirming the applicability of Cherokee law, this Court reasserted that
because the Cherokee Nation recognized him as a citizen, and because he
asserted his citizenship, he "was a citizen by adoption, and, consequently,
the jurisdiction over the offense charged herein is ... vested in the courts of
that Nation." Id. at 662.
Nofire was the last Supreme Court case to address adoption of non-racial
members as citizens for tribal jurisdiction, and clearly permits tribes to
maintain enrollment criteria that extend membership to racially unrelated
people. Like this Court deferred to Cherokee law when finding that a white
man may be enrolled in a tribe and treated as an Indian for adjudicatory
purposes in Nofire, this Court should respect the Native Molokinian
Government's prerogative to extend membership to adopted children that
may lack Native Molokinian blood in the instant case. In Nofire, this Court
respected a tribal membership ordinance that acknowledged men who
married Cherokee women as members without requiring any other cultural
tie to the community. Here, the Native Molokinian Government only
extends membership to children adopted by Tribal members that have
maintained a significant cultural, social, or civic connection to the Native
Molokinian community and wish to participate in the organization of the
Native Molokinian governing entity. If this Court respected a tribal
membership ordinance based on marriage alone, it should also respect the
Native Molokinian Government's membership ordinance that seeks to
extend membership based on respect for and deference to a long-standing,
traditional Native Molokinian cultural practice of social organization.
Finally, a specific blood quantum is not dispositive of Indian status for
adjudicatory purposes in criminal and child welfare cases, and from a
policy perspective, should not be considered a requisite for enrollment here.
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"The term 'Indian' has not been statutorily defined but instead has been
judicially explicated over the years." United States v. Broncheau, 597 F.2d
1260, 1263 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 859 (1979). For example, in
criminal cases, courts generally consider the degree of Indian blood, and
tribal or government recognition as an Indian when determining whether or
not a claimant may be considered Indian for jurisdictional purposes. United
States v. Keys, 103 F.3d 758, 761 (9th Cir. 1996) (quoting Broncheau, 597
F.2d at 1263). However, the application of these requirements proves
inconsistent. See, e.g., U.S. v. Rogers, 45 U.S. 567, 573 (1846) (adoption
into Cherokee Tribe as an adult alone was not sufficient to be considered
Indian); Vezina v. United States, 245 F. 411 (8th Cir.1917) (between 1/4
and 3/8 Chippewa person was held to be Indian); Sully v. United States, 195
F. 113 (8th Cir.1912) (1/8 sufficient to be Indian); St. Cloud v. United
States, 702 F.Supp. 1456, 1460 (D.S.D. 1988) (15/32 Yankton Sioux was
sufficient to be held Indian). Today neither eligibility nor enrolment are
required to prove Indian status if that individual is recognized as an Indian
by the community, United States v. Bruce, 394 F.3d 1215, 1225-26 (9th Cir.
2005).
Similarly, in the Indian Child Welfare Act ("ICWA") 25 U.S.C. §§ 1901
cases, courts often look to tribal enrollment criteria to establish whether or
not the child can be considered Indian under the statute. See, e.g., Indian
Tribe v. Doe, 849 P.2d 925, 928 (Idaho 1993); John v. Baker, 30 P.3d 68,
73 (Alaska 2001). Tribal enrollment does not necessarily require Indian
blood. To be considered an "Indian child" under ICWA, the child must be
"any unmarried person who is under age eighteen and is either (a) a
member of an Indian tribe or (b) is eligible for membership in an Indian
tribe and is the biological child of a member of an Indian tribe." 25 U.S.C.
§ 1903(4). Courts have interpreted that this definition may still implicate
Indian status even though the child may lack tribal determination, 1-11
Cohen's Handbook of Federal Indian Law § 11.02 (citing see Doe, 849 P.2d
at 928; In re A.P., 962 P.2d 1186 (Mont. 1998)), and that children may be
considered Indian for the purposes of the Act even if their ancestry is
uncertain, see In re J. T., 693 A.2d 283 (Vt. 1997); In re Adoption of a Child
of Indian Heritage, 543 A.2d 925 (N.J. 1988). Thus, like in the criminal
cases, a claimant may be enrolled or eligible to be enrolled, and may be the
biological child of an enrolled member, and still lack Native blood if tribal
enrollment doesn't require it. In short, not all people with Indian blood are
legally considered to be Indian, and people lacking any Indian blood may
still be considered legally Indian.
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The inconsistent application of the blood quantum and membership
requirements in criminal and child welfare cases demonstrates that the
question of "Indianness" is a broad one, and can neither be considered
purely racial nor purely political. From a general policy perspective, if
courts broadly determine who is Indian for adjudicatory purposes, tribes
should also be able to broadly determine who its members are for purposes
of civic and cultural participation. Accordingly, affirming the Native
Molokinian Government's ability to enroll members that may lack Native
Molokinian blood but maintain specific cultural ties to the community is
consistent with the trend to broadly construe Indian status in the federal
common law.
In summation, this Court is barred from reviewing the OFA's decision to
recognize the Native Molokinian Government because federal recognition
is a non-justiciable political question. Even if this Court were to review the
OFA's finding based on the membership ordinance, it should find that the
OFA properly recognizing the Native Molokinian Government according to
federal regulations and federal common law. Accordingly, this Court
should affirm the Ninth District Court of Appeals's decision to uphold the
OFA's federal recognition of the Native Molokinian Government, and
affirm the Secretary's placement of the 50,000 acres of land into trust for
the Tribe.
B. The Native Molokinian Government appropriately exercised its inherent
sovereign authority when it extended membership to adopted children
without Native Molokinian blood, and accords with constitutional
limitations on race-based classifications.
By recognizing the Native Molokinian Government, the federal
government recognizes the Native Molokinian Government's sovereign
authority to self-govern. 25 C.F.R. § 83.2. The Ninth Circuit Court of
Appeals properly held that the Native Molokinian Government had the right
to define descendancy for membership purposes as part of its inherent
sovereign authority to self-govern, and this Court should uphold the
Secretary's decision to place 50,000 acres of land into trust for the Tribe
because (1) this Court does not have the authority to review issues
involving Native Molokinian Government membership, and (2) to reinstate
a race-based policy for recognition would be to accept an unconstitutionally
discriminatory policy.
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1. The Native Molokinian Government retains the inherent sovereign
right to determine its membership, and this Court does not have the
authority to review those provisions.
Tribes are "distinct, independent political communities, retaining their
original natural rights, as the undisputed possessors of the soil, from time
immemorial. . . ." Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. 515, 559 (1832). As such,
Indian nations retain the inherent sovereign right to self-governance that is
both pre and extra-constitutional, and can only be diminished by a clear act
of Congress. United States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313, 323-24 (1978).
Although tribes have been divested of many of their sovereign attributes
since the time of contact, one power remains clear: tribes retain exclusive
and plenary power to govern their members. Montana v. U. S., 450 U.S.
544, 564 (1981).
The inherent sovereign right of tribal self-governance includes the right
to determine tribal membership. Id. This long-standing legal and political
precedent exempts "purely intramural matters such as conditions of tribal
membership" from federal statutes that otherwise apply to Indian tribes.
Lewis v. Norton, 424 F.3d 959, 961 (9th Cir. 2005) (citing Donovan v.
Coeur d'Alene Tribal Farm, 751 F.2d 1113, 1116 (9th Cir. 1985)); see also
Apodaca v. Silvas, 19 F.3d 1015, 1016 (5th Cir. 1994); Smith v. Babbitt,
100 F.3d 556, 559 (8th Cir. 1996)). Because determining tribal membership
is an essential attribute of sovereignty, challenges to enrollment provisions
are not subject to review by this Court. Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez,
436 U.S. 49, 72 (1978).
In Santa Clara, id. 63, this Court found that it did not have the authority
to adjudicate Tribal membership disputes. In Santa Clara, a female tribal
member sought declaratory and injunctive relief under the Indian Civil
Rights Act ("ICRA") because the Pueblo's enrollment ordinance granted
membership to children of men who married outside of the Tribe, but
refused membership to the children of women who married outside the
Tribe. Id. at 51. This Court ruled in favor of tribal sovereignty and reversed
the Tenth Circuit's decision, holding that it was "unpersuaded that a
judicially sanctioned intrusion into tribal sovereignty is required to fulfill
the purposes of the ICRA." Id. at 61. It found that regardless of the
sensitive merits being adjudicated, the right for tribes to define membership
had "long been recognized as central to its existence as an independent
political community," and that "the role of courts in adjusting relations
between and among tribes and their members" is limited. Id. at 72. In the
end, this Court found that absent an act from Congress, the Pueblo was
solely responsible for establishing the appropriate balance between ICRA
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and membership ordinances, and that ". . . to abrogate tribal decisions,
particularly in the delicate area of membership, for whatever 'good'
reasons, is to destroy cultural identity under the guise of saving it." Id. at
55.
The impermissibility for Courts to adjudicate tribal membership issues
applies equally to challenges to the tribe itself as it does to complaints
against the federal government. See, e.g., Ordinance 59 Ass' v. U.S. Dept.
ofInterior Sec'y, 163 F.3d 1150, 1189-60 (10th Cir. 1998); Lewis, 424 F.3d
at 963; Williams v. Gover, 490 F.3d 785, 787-88 (9th Cir. 2007). Both the
Ninth and Tenth Circuits have specifically held that plaintiffs "cannot get
around the Santa Clara rule by bringing suit against the government, rather
than the tribe itself." Lewis, 424 F.3d at 963. For example, in Williams, 490
F.3d at 787-88, two former members of the terminated Mooretown
Rancheria were not able to re-enroll following reinstatement because of a
tribal ordinance that narrowed membership criteria. In an attempt to skirt
the clear Santa Clara precedent, instead of challenging the Tribe, the
claimants challenged the Bureau of Indian Affairs ("BIA") under the APA.
Id. at 789. The Court found that the BIA did not promulgate any rule by
tacitly approving the new membership ordinance and did not implicate the
APA, and that under Santa Clara, the BIA could not determine tribal
membership even if it wanted to. Id. at 790-91. The Tribe has the "power to
squeeze the plaintiffs out, because it has the power to define its own
membership . . . For this reason, the BIA could not have defined the
membership of Mooretown Rancheria, even if had tried." Id.
Accordingly, by challenging the Secretary's decision to take land into
trust for the Native Molokinian Government vis-A-vis the Office of Federal
Acknowledgment's ("OFA") recognition process, the State does not avoid
Santa Clara in the case at bar. Just like the Pueblo in Santa Clara, the
Native Molokinian Government is a federally recognized Indian nation that
retains the inherent sovereign power to determine who its members are.
(Problem $ 6.) After receiving State recognition under Act 200, the Native
Molokinian Government independently organized to seek federal
recognition under the OFA. (Id.) The OFA officially recognized the Native
Molokinian Government in January 2016 (id.). As demonstrated above, the
OFA properly recognized the Native Molokinian Government, and
officially established the Tribes' sovereign authority to self-govern. If this
Court was able to uphold the Santa Clara Pueblo's sovereign right to sustain
a blatantly discriminatory membership ordinance, it should also uphold the
Native Molokinian Government's sovereign authority to implement an
ordinance that extends membership to culturally affiliated adopted children.
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Membership rules are 'no more or less than a mechanism of social . . .
self-definition,"' and are "basic to the tribe's survival as a cultural and
economic entity." Santa Clara, 436 U.S. at 54 (citing Martinez v. Santa
Clara Pueblo, 402 F. Supp. 5, 15 (D.N.M. 1975)), and this Court simply
should not intervene in this strictly tribal matter, regardless of the
substantive provisions of membership ordinances.
Since Santa Clara, state and federal Courts have consistently upheld
tribal sovereignty when refusing to review tribal membership issues. See,
e.g., Equal Employment Opportunity Comm'n v. Fond du Lac Heavy Equip.
& Constr. Co., 986 F.2d 246, 249 (8th Cir. 1993); Martinez v. Southern Ute
Tribe, 249 F.2d 915, 920 (10th Cir. 1957); Smith, 100 F.3d 556; Jeffredo v.
Macarro, 599 F.3d 913 (9th Cir. 2009). This Court is obliged to follow this
precedent, and should uphold the Native Molokinian Government's
sovereign authority to define tribal membership.
2. To reinstate a race-based policy for Native Molokinian recognition
would be to accept an unconstitutionally discriminatory policy.
Federally recognized tribes are privy to certain statutory and regulatory
benefits that stem from their unique government-government relationship
with the federal government. 25 C.F.R. § 83.2. Policies that favor Indians
over non-Indians are constitutionally permissible when preference "is
granted to Indians not as a discrete racial group, but, rather, as members of
quasi-sovereign tribal entities," based on a long history of diplomatic
relations with the federal government. Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535,
555-54 (1974). Because Indian status is political and not racial, special
treatment need only be rationally related to "Congress's unique obligation
toward the Indians." Id. at 555. On the other hand, if a policy granting
special treatment to Native people is primarily race-based, it will likely be
struck down on equal protection grounds. Rice v. Cayetano, 528 U.S. 495,
497 (2000).
For example, in Rice this Court struck down an ordinance that limited
voting in the Office of Hawaiian Affairs ("OHA") to people of native
Hawaiian, "or as descendants of not less than one-half part of the races
inhabiting the islands before 1778," and Hawaiian ancestry, or
"descendants of the peoples inhabiting the Hawaiian Islands in 1778,"
under the 15f Amendment. It distinguished Mancari by finding that
granting voting privileges according to Hawaiian ancestry was merely a
proxy for race, because "[tihe inhabitants shared common physical
characteristics, and by 1778 they had a common culture," and because
"[t]he history of the State's definition also demonstrates that the State has
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used ancestry as a racial definition and for a racial purpose." Id. at 496.
Because OHA's categorization was racial and not political, this Court found
the voting provision failed because "it rests on the demeaning premise that
citizens of a particular race are somehow more qualified than others to vote
on certain matters." Id. at 497.
Ironically, the State asks that this Court reverse the Secretary's decision
to bring the 50,000 acres of former Molokinian land into trust for the Tribe
because the Native Molokinian Government is not distinguished by race
alone. (Problem 7.) The State seeks to reinstate recognition by the criteria
established in the 1921 Homestead Act, which defines a Native Molokinian
as "any descendant of not less than one-half part of the blood of the races
inhabiting Molokini previous to 1778." (Problem 2, 9.) The criterion the
State asks this Court to establish is strikingly similar to the racial
categorization of native Hawaiians that was struck down in Rice. In
contrast, the current membership provisions promulgated by the Native
Molokinian Government complies with the Rice precedent because
extending membership to adopted children that may not have the requisite
blood deems that delineation political, and not racial. Although a challenge
to legislation recognizing an Indian tribe is not the same as challenging a
voting ordinance, this Court should consider the implications of Rice in
potential challenges to legislation that may favor Native Molokinian people
in the future.
In conclusion, the Ninth District Court of Appeals properly upheld the
federal recognition of the Native Molokinian Government because the
Native Molokinian Government retains the inherent sovereign right to
determine descendancy or membership purposes. This Court should affirm
the Native Molokinian Government's current membership provisions
because to accept the State's appeal to reinstate a race-based policy for
recognition would be to accept an unconstitutionally discriminatory policy
that would likely be struck down in the future. Accordingly, this Court
should respect the sovereign authority of the Native Molokinian
Government, adhere to current Supreme Court precedent that prohibits
statutes favoring Native people based on race alone, and uphold the
Secretary's decision to place the 50,000 acres of former Molokinian land in
trust for the Tribe.
Conclusion
The Supreme Court should affirm the United States Court of Appeals for
the Ninth Circuit, and uphold the Secretary of Interior's decision to put
50,000 acres of land into trust for the Native Molokinian Nation in
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accordance with 25 U.S.C § 465 of the Indian Reorganization Act, because
the Secretary has authority to hold land in trust for the federally recognized
Tribe. The Secretary has authority under the Indian Reorganization Act to
hold land in trust for the Native Molokinian Government, because the tribe
was federally recognized prior to the IRA's implementation, the 2013
Amendments make all federally recognized tribes eligible to have land
placed in trust, and the Native Molokinians' federal status did not change
with the subsequent recognition of the Molokinian Nation.
The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals rightly upheld the federal
recognition of the Native Molokinian Government even though it extends
membership to adopted children without Native Molokinian blood. The
OFA properly exercised its authority in recognizing the Native Molokinian
Government, and the Native Molokinian Government has the power to
determine membership as part of its inherent sovereign right to self-govern
without the scrutiny of this Court. Accordingly, this Court should affirm the
Secretary's decision to bring the 50,000 acres of land into trust for the
Tribe.
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